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I study the optimal redistributive structure when individuals with distinct produc-
tivities also diﬀer in disutility of work due to either disability or distaste for work.
Taxpayers have resentment against inactive beneﬁt recipients because some of them
are not actually disabled but lazy. Therefore, disabled people who take up transfers
are stigmatized. Their stigma disutility increases with the number of non-disabled
recipients. Tagging transfers according to disability characteristics decreases stigma.
However, tagging is costly and imperfect. In this context, I show how the level of the
per capita cost of monitoring relative to labor earnings of low-wage workers determines
the optimality of tagging. Under mild conditions, despite their stigma disutility, inac-
tive and disabled people get a strictly lower consumption than low-wage workers. The
results are valid under a utilitarian criterion and a criterion which does not compensate
for distaste for work.
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1 Introduction
In 2005, 60% of disability beneﬁts’ recipients suﬀered from mental disorders, 18% suﬀered
from diseases of the musculoskeletal (e.g., back pain, osteoporosis, arthritis) or of the
nervous system and most of the others had endocrine, blood, respiratory and circulatory
diseases (Social Security Administration, 2006). Most of these disabilities are generally
neither easily observable nor perfectly monitorable even with a deep medical examination.
Moreover, for being eligible for disability beneﬁts, the U.S. Social Security Act requires that
the impairment precludes a substantial gainful activity (Hu et al., 2001). This condition
adds diﬃculties to screen between eligible and non-eligible people applying for disability
beneﬁts. Therefore, disability transfer systems, so-called tagging systems, are always
imperfect. Some of those who take up beneﬁts will not “deserve” them, so-called type II
errors. Benitez-Silva et al. (2004b) estimate that approximately 20% of applicants who
are ultimately awarded beneﬁts are not disabled. And some of those who are eligible for
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1beneﬁts will not take them up. In EU countries, about 30% of people (between 25 to 59
years old) who report severe disability do not get disability beneﬁts and therefore work
(Eurostat, 2001). However, the standard tagging literature assumes that eligible people
do not work whether they are tagged or untagged (e.g., Salanié, 2002). Alternatively,
the literature studies whether or not undeserving tagged recipients should be induced to
work (e.g., Parsons, 1996; Boadway et al, 1999). Moreover, in much of the previous work
on tagging since the seminal paper by Akerlof (1978), the decision of taking-up disability
beneﬁts is not modelled. An exogenously given probability determines whether eligible
people are tagged or not. This paper examines how endogenizing the taking-up decision
and having disabled people who do not apply for disability beneﬁts and therefore work
modify the optimal redistributive schedule in a standard tagging model.
Non-taking up exists due to costs of learning about and applying for the program or
due to stigma costs (e.g., Sen, 1995; Currie, 2006). In this paper, we emphasize stigma as
an explanation of the non-take-up phenomenon. This focus is motivated by the growing
evidence that stigma is important (Hancock et al., 2004; Pudney et al, 2006) and by the
relative lack of interest in this explanation in the economic literature, especially in optimal
taxation models. Stigma results here from statistical discrimination. Society is deemed
to value certain individual characteristics such as a willingness to work hard when one
is able to do so (Sen, 1995; Lindbeck et al, 1999). A social norm claiming that disabled
low-productivity people should get transfers also prevails (Wolﬀ, 2004). However, due
to the imperfect observability of disability, among inactive recipients there are lazy able
people. The existence of this proportion of frauders is known in the society. Since people
are unable to distinguish perfectly between able and disabled people, they infer that any
inactive beneﬁciary may be a potential cheater. Recipients are then treated badly by
other members of society. They are and feel stigmatized and embarrassed because they
are believed to be lazy, on average. Stigma, as perceived by deserving individuals, increases
with the number of undeserving recipients. No empirical papers have studied this statistical
stigma phenomenon up to now. However, anecdotal evidence about people who cheat in
welfare programs and then create doubts or social resentment against their peers, seems
persistent enough to open the path of more investigations.1 This modelling of stigma is
also based on Besley and Coate (1992). To the best of my knowledge, this endogenous
stigma mechanism is novel to the optimal income tax literature.
I study the optimal redistributive structure when individuals with distinct produc-
tivities also diﬀer in disutility of work due to either disability or distaste for work. The
government faces the usual adverse selection problem. It only observes incomes, nei-
ther productivities nor the disutility parameters. Therefore, some able people may be
tempted to mimic disabled people, i.e. to choose the bundle intended for the latter. A
costly monitoring technology and endogenous stigma are modelled. Tagging improves the
equity-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ by limiting mimicking eﬀects and by reducing stigma intensity
1Anecdotal evidence about this statistical stigma eﬀect also exists in politics or sport. For instance,
during the 2006 Tour de France, when several exceptional bikers were revealed to have taken drugs to
improve their performances, the entire profession lost its credibility and all bikers became suspected of
being cheaters.
2compared to a simple tax system based only on reported income. I show that the use
of tagging is recommended when its gains in terms of incentives and of stigma are larger
than its monitoring costs. In spite of the stylized nature of the model, simulations suggest
that tagging is optimal as long as the per capita cost of monitoring does not take unre-
alisticly high values. I analytically show that it is always optimal to have some disabled
and able people who work. Untagged workers have a larger consumption level (i.e. net
labor earnings) than tagged disabled recipients at the optimum. The derived ranking of
consumption levels can seem counter-intuitive at ﬁrst sight since tagged disabled who have
the lowest consumption level also burden the disutility of stigma. A direct eﬃciency eﬀect
implies this counterintuitive ranking. Intuitively, a larger consumption bundle for tagged
disabled recipients than untagged disabled workers would imply that a smaller proportion
of disabled enter the labor force (ceteris paribus) and more disabled then rely on disability
beneﬁts. There is then a direct loss of eﬃciency which would be exacerbated by the in-
creasing number of able people cheating and applying for these relatively higher disability
beneﬁts. Beside these eﬃciency losses, since fraud would increase, the increased stigma
suﬀered by the untagged disabled would imply an equity loss. The equity gain from tagged
disabled people who get a larger transfer than untagged disabled would not oﬀset these
equity and eﬃciency losses. Consumption when untagged is then strictly larger than when
tagged.
This result challenges the traditional ranking of consumption levels. In standard tag-
ging models, the consumption level of untagged (inactive) disabled is always lower than
the one of tagged (inactive) disabled. Compared to a simple tax system based only on
income reports, tagging allows to relax the self-selection constraints while improving the
well-being of some of the needy by increasing consumption of tagged disabled people. Since
disabled are by assumption always inactive, no eﬃciency eﬀect pushes the consumption of
untagged disabled above the one of tagged disabled.
We proceed in the following section by setting up the basic model in the absence of
tagging. Section 3 presents the ﬁrst and second-best optima without tagging. In Section
4, I incorporate tagging in the model. The optimality of tagging is then discussed and
illustrated with numerical examples. Appendix 1 contains the proofs of all propositions
and lemmata.
2 The model
Productivities, disabilities and tastes for work
I consider an economy where a typical agent is described by a set of exogenous charac-
teristics, denoted by χ = (w,δ,∆). The ﬁrst coordinate, w, denotes his productivity,
δ measures disutility when working due to disability, i.e. the intensity of the physical
or mental pain associated with work due to disability if relevant (Harkness, 1993; Cuﬀ,
2000). The third coordinate, ∆, is disutility when working due to distaste for work (work
aversion) (Laroque, 2005). These characteristics are private information to each person;
their distributions are public information.
3I denote γ the proportion of disabled people in the population. Their productivity is
wℓ. 1 − γ is the proportion of able people in the population. Their productivity is wh,
with wh > wℓ > 0. For simplicity, there is then a perfect correlation between disability
and a lower productivity. This assumption is also in the vein of the statutory deﬁnition
of disabled people who are eligible for disability beneﬁts. The applicant is considered
to be disabled not just because of the existence of a medical impairment, but because
the impairment (drastically) reduces his productivity and precludes any substantial and
gainful work (Hu at al., 2001). A disabled worker in a wheelchair who has the functional
capability to engage in a substantial gainful job is not considered a disabled neither by
the U.S. Social Security Act nor in my model.
When working, an agent produces a quantity w ∈ {wℓ,wh} of an undiﬀerentiated
desirable commodity which can be reinterpreted as working in a low-productivity or a
high-productivity job.
The disutility due to disability δ is distributed on the interval [0,∞[, according to the
cumulative distribution Fδ(δ) and its associated density function fδ(δ), with fδ(δ) > 0
∀δ ∈ [0,∞[ and limδ→∞ fδ(δ) = 0. Only disabled people are concerned by the disutility
from disability when working (i.e. δ = 0 for able people). The distaste for work ∆ is
distributed on the interval [0,∞[, according to the cumulative distribution F∆(∆) and the
density function f∆(∆). By assumption, f∆(∆) > 0 ∀∆ ∈ [0,∞[ with lim∆→∞f∆(∆) = 0.
Diﬀering from standard tagging models, some disabled people choose to work despite their
handicaps, and then do not suﬀer stigma costs. For simplicity, I assume that disabled
people do not suﬀer from distaste for work (∆ = 0).
Agents choose whether or not to participate in the labor force as in Choné and Laroque
(2005) and Laroque (2005). Since extensive labor supply responses tend to be strong for
low-skilled workers (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001) and since the
evidence of responses in terms of labor hours on the job (along the intensive margin) are
much more limited (Saez, 2001), assuming an extensive margin is realistic. The participa-
tion status of agent χ is described with a function s(χ), where s(χ) is equal to 0 (no work)
or 1 (work). In the second-best environment which I shall be considering, when an agent
works, his number of produced units of commodity, but not his productivity, is observed
by the government (or tax authority). When an able agent participates (s(χ) = 1), he
chooses to produce either wh or wℓ units of commodity, while he does not produce any
marketable good when he does not participate (s(χ) = 0). When a disabled agent par-
ticipates (s(χ) = 1), he is able to produce only wℓ units of commodity, while he does not
produce any marketable good when he does not participate (s(χ) = 0).
The tagging technology
In a simple redistributive tax system without tagging, income taxes and transfers de-
pend only on reported income, i.e. on units of commodity produced. When tagging is
introduced, disability agencies have access to more information than the tax authority.
Targeted transfers are restricted for disabled claimants. However, disability agencies only
imperfectly observe abilities, w, and still do not observe distaste for work, ∆. Hence,
tagging involves errors. With a probability   (0       1), so-called type II error, able
4individuals (“false positive”) are accepted. The accuracy of tagging depends on the per
capita amount of resources, M, devoted to it and is translated in terms of the probability
of type II error,  . The lower is  , the higher the precision with which an able agent
claiming disability beneﬁts is detected. The per capita cost of monitoring, M( ), depends
on the precision of the monitoring technology with ∂M
∂  < 0, ∂2M
∂2    0, lim →0 M( ) = +∞
and M(1) = 0. Monitoring takes place ex ante: it occurs before any beneﬁt is distributed.
It seems realistic to assume no sanction, whatsoever, including exposure or non-informal
sanction of the caught non-eligible individuals.
Type II error aside, the accuracy of tagging is also limited by a non-take-up phenom-
enon. Even if disabled people are aware of their eligibility, part of them might not claim
disability beneﬁts to avoid disability beneﬁt and the associated stigma. For tractability,
the imperfection of tagging is limited to type II errors and non-take-up. Disability agen-
cies perfectly tag disabled people who apply for disability assistance (i.e., there is no ‘false
negative’ or type I error).
Stigma
There is a social norm to earn one’s income from work when one is able to do so (Elster,
1989; Sen, 1995; Lindbeck et al., 1999) and transfers are regarded as entitlements for
deserving people–e.g. disabled and very low productivity people (Romer, 1997; Wolﬀ,
2004). Taxpayers know from media that among the inactive people who get transfers
there are able people with high distaste for work. These undeserving can generally not
(perfectly) be distinguished from the deserving, neither by the tax authority and nor by
people in general. Hence, undeserving individuals impose a “reputational externality”
(Besley and Coate, 1992) on the deserving ones. When it is known that an individual is
inactive (or on disability assistance), other individuals will infer that this individual will
likely be lazy. To be a disabled inactive recipient and considered as an undeserving (i.e.
lazy) recipient, when one truly is disabled is demeaning and stigmatizing. Stigma results
here from statistical discrimination. Hence let us call it statistical stigmatization. It seems
realistic to assume that statistical stigma hurts those who are disabled and choose to claim
disability beneﬁts more than able recipients because disabled people face a limited choice
set. For tractability and without loss of generality, I then assume zero stigma eﬀect for
the able recipients.
Disabled people who take up transfers feel–and are– stigmatized, hence are burdened
by a disutility, −σ with stigma level σ   0. In Besley and Coate (1992), stigma is an
increasing function of the diﬀerence between the average disutility of all welfare recipients
and a social norm (the latter is assumed to be equal to the average disutility of labor
within the population as a whole). I rather model stigma as an increasing function of the
number of undeserving recipients. The higher this number is (the more people depreciate
inactive recipients), the higher is stigma. I then deﬁne stigma as:
σ(π∆
ι ) = gπ∆
ι with 0   g < ∞
where π∆
ι is the number of people who unduly collect beneﬁts, i.e. the proportion of able
5who are inactive in the population.2 To ﬁx g = 0 is equivalent to neglecting stigma eﬀects.
For my qualitative results to be valid, all I really need is that there be a monotonic positive
relationship between π∆
ι and the subjective number of undeserving recipients taxpayers
inferred from media.3
Alternatively, stigma can be deﬁned as an increasing function of the proportion of un-
deserving recipients among all recipients. This assumption does not modify the qualitative
nature of the results as shown in Appendix 2. Lindbeck et al. (1999) argue that living on
transfers becomes relatively less embarrassing when more individuals do likewise. When
the population share of transfer recipients is large (small), the individual’s discomfort from
such a lifestyle is relatively weak (strong). In my model, who receives the beneﬁts also
matters. Reducing the number of undeserving recipients reduces stigma.
Individual utilities and threshold values
The agents’ behaviors depend on their disutility when working (∆ for able workers,
δ for disabled workers) and on stigma (σ) when inactive and disabled. Income, or con-
sumption, is assumed to always be desirable. Utility of consumption u(c) is a continuous,
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave function with limc→0 u′(c) = +∞.
In the second-best environment, for each individual the government observes only the
number of produced units of the commodity.4 Productivities are imperfectly observed by
disability agencies and only when agents apply for disability beneﬁts. The other individ-
ual characteristics, δ and ∆, are never observable and then cannot be used to base the
tax-subsidy scheme on. Therefore, at most three distinct tax/transfer levels can be im-
plemented which is equivalent to three consumption bundles: cι for inactive people, cδ for
agents producing wℓ units of commodity, c∆ for agents producing wh units of commodity.
In the standard tagging literature, the participation status is exogenous and the same
for all disabled people: they all do not work (e.g. Parsons, 1996; Salanié, 2002).5 In my
model, according to his own disability characteristic δ, each disabled person decides to
work or not. The utility level of a disabled agent χ = (wℓ,δ,∆ = 0) is
 
u(cι) − σ(π∆
ι ) when s = 0
u(cδ) − δ when s = 1
(1)
The individual is either inactive (s = 0), gets disability beneﬁt cι and suﬀers from stigma-
tization σ(.) or he works (s = 1), has cδ after taxation and suﬀers a pain δ caused by his
2As in Besley and Coate (1992), disabled recipients experience the same stigma cost. Precisely how
much a disabled person will feel stigmatized will also depend on individual speciﬁc characteristics, e.g.
his own self-esteem. For tractability, the model endogenizes stigma but neglects heterogeneity in stigma
intensities.
3Alternatively, I may consider that the proportion of able people (1−γ) is common knowledge and that
a statistic over people employed in high-productivity jobs is also available. Therefore, by substraction,
every taxpayer can deduce the number of undeserving recipients, π
∆
ι .
4In Choné and Laroque (2005) and Laroque (2005), an agent reveals his true productivity when he
works (agent’s productivity is not observed when he does not work). Therefore, when any agent with
productivity w participates, he produces w units of commodity. I relax this assumption here: productivity
levels of workers are not observable.
5In the seminal paper of Akerlof (1978), all disabled people do work and have the same gross labor
earnings when they are tagged or untagged. My model assumes distinct working status when tagged or
untagged as conﬁrmed by empirical evidence presented in the introduction.
6disability. As noted by Parsons (1996) and Salanié (2002), it is realistic to assume that a
recipient of disability beneﬁt is banned from working.




u(cι) with probability   when s = 0
Max(u(cδ),u(c∆)) − ∆ with probability (1 −  ) when s = 0
Max(u(cδ),u(c∆)) − ∆ when s = 1
An able agent can choose to apply for disability beneﬁts and, hence, not work (s = 0). He
then gets beneﬁts with probability  . With probability (1− ), he is caught and therefore
goes back to work where his utility is Max(u(cδ),u(c∆))−∆. Alternatively, an able agent
can choose to work (s = 1). He then produces wh or wℓ units of the good depending on
the ranking of c∆ and cδ at the optimum. If cδ = c∆, I assume that able workers prefer to
produce wh units of good.
Since the unobservable parameters δ and ∆ are distributed on inﬁnite size support,
it simply becomes too costly (unfeasible) to induce all able and disabled to participate
in the labor force. So, whatever the allocation of consumption levels, there will be some
ﬁnite cutoﬀ levels   δ and   ∆ such that only disabled agents with δ <   δ work while those
with δ >   δ do not work and only able people with ∆ <   ∆ work and those characterized by
∆ >   ∆ claim disability beneﬁts and receive them with probability  . The cut-oﬀ values
or threshold levels satisfy the following equalities:
  δ = u(cδ) − u(cι) + σ(π∆
ι ) (2)
and, as regards   ∆, we have for the case c∆   cδ:
u(c∆) −   ∆ = u(cι)  + [u(c∆) −   ∆](1 −  )
⇔   ∆ = u(c∆) − u(cι) (3)
When c∆ < cδ:
u(cδ) −   ∆ = u(cι)  + [u(cδ) −   ∆](1 −  )
⇔   ∆ = u(cδ) − u(cι) (4)
Equations (3) and (4) emphasize that the decision of able people to apply or not for
disability beneﬁts does not depend on the probability  .
Proposition 1 Consumption when producing more units of good (wh) is larger than when
producing less (wℓ): c∆   cδ
It follows that for able workers, the strategy to choose to produce wℓ units is strictly
dominated by the choice of producing wh(> wℓ) units:
Max (u(cδ) − ∆,u(c∆) − ∆) = u(c∆) − ∆,∀∆
The statistical stigma function σ(π∆
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and, from (3),   ∆ is a
function of c∆ and cι. Moreover, σ → g(1 − γ) if   ∆ → 0. Equation (2) becomes
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If one wanted to guarantee that ∂￿ δ
∂cι < 06, we would need to assume that, at the optimum:
g <
1





   (8)
i.e. an upper bound on the marginal disutility of stigma. Inequality (8) takes the opposite
sign, i.e. a lower bound on g, if one wants to guarantee ∂  δ/∂cι > 0. A priori, any
restriction on g is assumed. I study in Section 5 when condition (8) is not satisﬁed.
Government
Two normative criteria are used in this paper. I consider a utilitarian Social Welfare
Function (SWF), i.e. a sum of utilities weighted by the share in the population, which
is generally used in the tagging literature and in the crime and fraud literature (e.g.,
Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995).
U
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I compare outcomes under the latter criterion and a criterion which does not compensate
for the distaste for work (∆) that I call the ∆-excluded criterion. The only diﬀerence with
the utilitarian criterion (9) is the term u(c∆) − ∆, which is substituted by u(c∆):
6Following an increase in cι, the global eﬀect on ￿ δ can be decomposed into a positive direct eﬀect
and a negative indirect eﬀect. The increase in the proportion of disabled people claiming assistance (or
equivalently the diminishing in the level of ￿ δ) is the direct eﬀect. The indirect eﬀect stems from the
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(10)
This government does not respect the consumer sovereignty principle for able people and
the objective function (10) violates the Pareto principle. However, by violating these
principles, the ∆-excluded criterion avoids the subjacent contradiction we have when using
a utilitarian criterion and a tagging or monitoring technology. It is contradictory to use
costly monitoring to screen people with high distaste for work, ∆, on the one hand, and to
compensate for distaste for work, ∆, by including ∆ in the SWF, (9), on the other hand.
The choice of the ∆-excluded criterion is also motivated by the literature which argues
in favor of a distinction between “relevant” and “irrelevant” characteristics (Fleurbaey and
Maniquet, 2006). Whereas the former calls for compensation, the latter does not, because
they are considered as being the responsibility of the individuals. In the same vein,
Arneson (1990) defends a conception of social justice as equal opportunity for welfare. He
also makes a distinction between the part of one’s utility for which one is responsible and
the part for which one is not. I therefore exclude from the normative criterion the part of
the utilities for which one is responsible for. The normative criterion is then a sum of such
corrected utility functions weighted by the share in the population. The interpretation
given to δ and ∆ determines their inclusion or not in the welfare criterion. In my setting,
individuals are not responsible for their ability which is interpreted as determined by their
innate characteristics and their family background. The mental or physical handicaps
when working, δ, simply reﬂect a plausible heterogeneity and are reasonably assumed not
to be the responsibility of these people. Disabled individuals are not responsible for the
statistical stigmatization phenomenon. One can then argue that they are not responsible
for the impact of stigmatization on their well-being (σ). Therefore, there are good reasons
to integrate these features in the objective function. In contrast, the government might
argue that income should not be transferred as compensation for distaste for work (∆)
because individuals are responsible for their own taste for work.
The distinction between the two criteria will become more explicit when I discuss the
ﬁrst-best optimum in Section 3.1.
The government budget constraint is
πδ(wℓ − cδ) + (πδ
ι + π∆








M( ) = −R (11)
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  the share of population which is able and inactive (they unduly collect
disability beneﬁts), π∆ = (1−γ)
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9which is able and work for labor earnings wh. The budget constraint includes per capita
costs of monitoring. The per capita cost of monitoring M( ) appears ex ante and for any












  . Thus, the total cost of monitoring is increasing in the proportion of monitored
individuals.
There exist four links between able and disabled people in the model. First, able
inactive people receive the same beneﬁt (cι) as disabled inactive people. This creates
mimicking problems which can be limited by increasing the diﬀerential c∆ − cδ and/or
by using costly tagging. Second, the disutility of work (∆) appears in the utility of able
workers as well as in the stigma disutility burdened by disabled inactive people. When
giving ﬁnancial incentives such that the proportion of able people who work increases
and then   ∆ increases, one also limits stigma. Third, stigma is also a function of  , the
proportion of type II errors. Investing tax receipts in monitoring reduces  , and, hence,
reduces stigma. Finally, the budget constraint (11) establishes the additional link.
3 Model without tagging
To better understand the role of stigma and mimicking on ﬁnancial incentives, I ﬁrst
neglect the tagging technology. As long as stigma prevails (g > 0), equation (2) grasps
that the ranking of cδ and cι is already an open question without introducing tagging.
No tagging means   = 1 and cι is then a transfer only based on income reported. Any
inactive person gets it.
As traditional, I study the optima, starting with the case of complete information of
the planner (ﬁrst-best), following with the situation where the planner only observes part
of the agents’ characteristics (second-best).
3.1 The ﬁrst-best social optimum
The ﬁrst-best social optimum is obtained when the social planner observes individual
characteristics χ = (w,δ,∆). Under both criteria (9) and (10), the ﬁrst-order conditions
require identical marginal utility for all individuals (equal to the marginal cost of public
funds, λ). Hence, consumption levels must be the same for all individuals:7
cδ = cι = c∆ = c (12)
Let us give the other characteristics of the ﬁrst-best optimum under the utilitarian
criterion ﬁrst. All able individuals with disutility of work below some cut-oﬀ   ∆ should
7This result depends on the additively separable utility functions. Among the possible speciﬁcations, an
alternative could be the form u(c−D), where D stands for the individual disutility (i.e. δ or ∆ or the stigma
function σ(π
ι
∆)). Then, at the ﬁrst-best utilitarian optimum, perfect insurance equalizes utility levels and
not consumptions. Most of the other outcomes will also depend on the chosen utility function. However,
the economics behind the optimal tax/transfer system would remain unchanged with this alternative
speciﬁcation. Further, the additively separable utility function has the advantage of comparing more
directly and more clearly my results with the traditional ones for which similar additively separable utility
functions and a utilitarian criterion as well are assumed (e.g., Akerlof, 1978; Diamond and Sheshinski,
1995; Parsons, 1996).
10work. The cut-oﬀ is determined by comparing the utility gain from an extra worker
producing wh, u(c∆) −   ∆ − u(cι) with the social value of extra net consumption as a
consequence of work, which is the sum of the gross income and the change in consumption
which results from the change in status:
u(c∆) −   ∆ − u(cι) = −u′(c)(wh − c∆ + cι)
More precisely, the optimal cut-oﬀ level for able individuals is such that the net loss of
utility when the marginal able individuals are shifted from inactivity to the work status
is equal to the gain of resources (wh) valued according to their common marginal utility:
  ∆ = u′(c)wh > 0 (13)
As   ∆ < ∞, some able people do not work, which highlights the previously mentioned
contradiction between the social norm prevailing in society against living on other’s work
if one is able and a utilitarian criterion which does compensate for distaste for work.
Moreover, from the previous equation and (5), σ(π∆
ι ) > 0 in ﬁrst-best with a utilitarian
criterion.
All disabled individuals with disability levels below some cut-oﬀ   δ should work. The
optimal cut-oﬀ level for individuals who produce wℓ is such that the net loss of utility
when the marginal disabled individuals are shifted from inactivity to work status is equal
to the gain in resources (wℓ) valued according to their common marginal utility:
  δ − σ(π∆
ι ) = u′(c)wℓ > 0 (14)
From the two previous equations,   ∆ and   δ are ﬁnite. It is then optimal for some able
and disabled people not to work under a utilitarian criterion.
With the ∆-excluded SWF in (10), turning to the cut-oﬀ   ∆, there is always a net gain
in utility when one more able individual shifts from being inactive to working. Moreover,
from (12), the social utility of the marginal individual is unchanged : u(c∆) − u(cι) = 0.
Therefore, under the ∆-excluded SWF in (10), it is optimal to place all able individuals
in work:
  ∆ → +∞
Therefore, there is no stigma eﬀect: σ(π∆
ι ) = 0. Introducing   ∆ → +∞ and (12) in the
budget constraint gives c = πδwℓ + π∆wh + R.
For disabled people, the cut-oﬀ is now determined by
u(cδ) −  δ − u(cι) = −u′(c)(wℓ − cδ + cι)
⇔   δ = u′(c)wℓ (15)
Therefore,   δ is ﬁnite which implies that it is optimal for some disabled individuals not to
work.
In a ﬁrst-best context, according to my results, the person should be pushed to work by
all means provided that their net loss of utility (due to stigma, disability or even distaste
11for work with a utilitarian criterion) is lower than the gain of resources, the diﬀerence
being a gain for society. In the next proposition, I summarize the ﬁrst-best results which
emphasize the distinction between the two alternative SWF.
Proposition 2 In a ﬁrst-best economy, some able people do not work (  ∆ < ∞) under the
utilitarian SWF (9) while they all do work under the ∆-excluded SWF (10) (  ∆ → +∞).
Stigma is strictly positive under the utilitarian SWF while it is zero under the ∆-excluded
SWF. Under both SWF, some disabled do enter the labor force while others do not.
3.2 The second-best optimum
I now turn to more realistic second-best situations, where the distributions of charac-
teristics in the society is common knowledge, but the individual agent’s characteristics
χ = (w,δ,∆) is private information. The tax authority (perfectly and costlessly) observes
reported income and, thus, also participation in the labor force. These are, however, the
only characteristics that taxes and subsidies can be made conditional on. I follow the
standard optimal tax and tagging literature (Mirrlees, 1971; Akerlof, 1978) and assume
no dishonest income reporting.
The second-best maximization problem requires the introduction of two additional
constraints, equations (3) and (6), beside the budget constraint (11). Equations (3) and
(6), which deﬁne cutoﬀ levels   ∆ and   δ, somewhat play the role of the more standard
self-selection constraints traditionally deﬁned in optimal tax models.
The utilitarian government maximizes (9) subject to (3), (6) and the budget constraint
(11). Since tagging is not considered   = 1 is substituted into this constrained optimization
problem.
The government which does not compensate for disutility of work maximizes (10)
subject to (3), (6), (11), and   = 1.
The following proposition paves the way towards a characterization of the second-best
consumption (or tax) schedules; it is valid under the two normative criteria and do not
require deriving the ﬁrst-order conditions to be shown.
Proposition 3 Under both criteria (9) and (10), it is always optimal to have some dis-
abled people not work,   δ < ∞, and some able mimicking disabled,   ∆ < ∞. It is also
optimal that some disabled and able people work in the economy,   δ > 0 and   ∆ > 0. The
consumption when producing wh units of goods is strictly larger than consumption when
inactive: c∆ > cι.
As is well-known from the optimal income tax literature, it may be eﬃcient that low ability
or disabled people do not work, simply because their productivity is not high enough to
compensate for the loss in their utility from work (Mirrlees, 1971). The literature (since
Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978) demonstrates that the optimal social insurance induces all
able individuals to work. Since disutilities when working are on an inﬁnite support here,
it is eﬃcient that some of the disabled, but also some of the able people, not work.
12Moreover, according to my results, the government should make work pay for a subset
of disabled people, and able people as well.
A still open question is the ranking of consumption levels while inactive (cι) and
while producing wℓ (cδ). I now develop the ﬁrst-order conditions from the constrained
maximization problem. I use λ as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint (11),   δ and   ∆ strictly are strictly positive (from Proposition 3), and I assume
the three consumption levels are strictly positive. The ﬁrst-order conditions and their
intuitions are ﬁrst given under the ∆-excluded criterion (10).
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where I have used ∂ ￿ ∆
∂c∆ = u′(c∆) > 0 from (3), ∂￿ δ
∂c∆ = u′(c∆) ∂σ
∂ ￿ ∆ < 0 since ∂￿ δ
∂σ = 1 (from
(6)) and
∂σ(￿ ∆)




< 0 (from (5)). The left-hand side of (16) is the
social value of giving consumption to the able workers rather than holding the resources.
The right-hand side actually characterizes the eﬀects due to imperfect information which
prevents us from reaching the ﬁrst-best outcome where u′(c) = λ ∀c ∈ {c∆,cι,cδ}. There
are three eﬀects. First, the eﬀect on the stigma function (borne by disabled recipients)
of a change in the cut-oﬀ   ∆ as a result of the change in consumption c∆. Second, the
eﬀect on net utilities (of marginal individuals characterized by ∆ =   ∆) of a change in
the cut-oﬀ   ∆ as a result of the change in consumption c∆. This term is present due to
the fact that ∆ is not included in the objective function. Third, the social value of the
resources savings from the induced changes in labor supplies. The net eﬀect on tax revenue
is ambiguous. Actually, the change in consumption c∆ has an eﬀect on   ∆ and on   δ. An
increase in c∆ attracts more able individuals to work and the revenue from income tax
increases. However, this decreases the intensity of the stigmatization. Therefore, more
disabled individuals will go to assistance which reduces the revenue from income tax (as









(wℓ − cδ + cι)u′(cδ) (17)
where we have used ∂￿ δ
∂cδ = u′(cδ) > 0 from (6). The left-hand sides of (17) is the social
value of giving consumption to the disabled workers rather than holding the resources.
The right-hand side is the social value of the resources savings from the induced changes
in the labor supply of the disabled individuals as a consequence of altered cδ. Actually,
increasing cδ reduces the proportion of inactive disabled individuals. This reduces beneﬁts
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where πι = πδ
ι +π∆
ι and where (7) and ∂ ￿ ∆
∂cι = −u′(cι) < 0 from (3) are used. The left-hand
side of (18) is the social value of giving consumption to the inactive (able and disabled)
people respectively, rather than holding the resources. The right-hand side includes three
eﬀects which prevents us from reaching the ﬁrst-best outcome. First, the eﬀect on the
stigma function (borne by disabled non-workers) of a change in the cut-oﬀ   ∆ as a result of
the change in consumption cι. Second, the eﬀect on net utilities of a change in the cut-oﬀ
  ∆ as a result of the change in consumption. Third, the social value of the resources savings
from the induced changes in labor supplies. Any change in consumption cι has a negative
eﬀect on   ∆ and on   δ as well as long as inequality (8) is satisﬁed. Increasing cι then reduces
the levied taxes since the number of both able and disabled workers decreases. When (8)
is violated, increasing cι increases   ∆. Hence the eﬀect on levied taxes is ambiguous.
A redistributive principle in the optimal redistributive program can be enounced as
follows.
Lemma 1 The inverse of the marginal cost of public funds is equal to the average of the
inverses of increasing by a unit the utility of each individual in each group, the weights













The weighted sum on the righthand-side comes from the weighted additively separable form
of the SWF (10). This formula emphasizes that the government should redistribute more
towards people whose marginal utility per population share is larger. This redistributive
principle has important implications for the beneﬁt structure of the redistributive system:
Proposition 4 Consumption of workers in low-productivity jobs is strictly larger than the
beneﬁt for inactive people, cδ > cι. It cannot be ruled out that workers in low-skilled jobs
pay taxes.
This result can seem counter-intuitive at ﬁrst sight since those who get the lowest con-
sumption are also those who suﬀer from stigma. However, compared to cι   cδ, cδ > cι
means that more disabled people work (ceteris paribus), so that more tax revenue is col-
lected from them. Eﬃciency is then improved. Second, disabled people who work do not
suﬀer from stigma, which means that equity is improved. Third, able individuals with
high preferences for leisure are less prone to claim disability beneﬁts when these are rela-
tively smaller (hence eﬃciency is improved). Finally, a decrease of disability fraud reduces
stigmatization and, ceteris paribus, improves the well-being of tagged disabled (hence eq-
uity increases). The equity-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ is then improved when cδ > cι compared to
cι   cδ.
14From Proposition 1 and 4, the optimal ranking of consumption levels is then c∆   cδ > cι.
Consider now the utilitarian Social Welfare Function (9).
Proposition 5 Qualitative properties highlighted with the ∆-excluded criterion are also
valid under the utilitarian criterion (9)
Compared to the ∆-excluded criterion, the solution under the utilitarian criterion is identi-
cal except that there is no more change in welfare (directly) due to the behavioral response
of the marginal able workers leaving the labor force, characterized by ∆ =   ∆. On the
margin these individuals are indiﬀerent between becoming inactive and remaining active
(see equation (3)). Their well-being weight is now the same in the SWF, whether they
are active or not, which is not the case under the ∆-excluded criterion. However, since
the SWF take both a weighted additively separable form, the qualitative nature of the
optimum under both criteria is identical. (This clearly appears in the proof). But this
does not mean that the optima are quantitatively identical as shown in Section 5.
4 Model with tagging
Let us now look at the case where the government considers that only disabled people are
eligible for receiving transfers (when inactive), and therefore introduce tagging.
4.1 The ﬁrst-best social optimum
In a ﬁrst-best economy, the government maximizes the SWF in (9) or (10) subject to
the budget constraint (11). As the set of individual characteristics χ is observable, the
disability agencies have no role to play and there is no monitoring, no type II error.
The characterization of the ﬁrst-best economy with tagging is then equivalent to the one
derived without tagging in Section 3.1.
4.2 The second-best optimum
Allowing tagging means assuming   as a variable and   ∈]0,1]. I turn now to the con-
strained maximization of the ∆-excluded SWF. The government maximizes (10) subject
to the budget constraint (11) and equations (3) and (6). The multiplier associated with
the budget constraint is again denoted by λ. Again   δ,   ∆ > 0, the ﬁrst-order conditions




























15where I have used ∂σ




< 0 (from (5)). In equation (20) and the


























































































where I have used ∂￿ δ






> 0 from (5) and (6).
Equations (20)-(22) and their interpretations are identical to (16)-(18) except that the
monitoring costs and eﬀects on the level of activity of people have to be considered. Now,




among the 1−γ able
workers are inactive and get disability beneﬁts, i.e. the proportion of total population π∆
ι .
Let us now turn to the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to  , i.e. equations (23)
and (24). In case of a corner solution   = 1, i.e. tagging is suboptimal and we have the
inequality sign in (24). In case of an interior solution   < 1, it is optimal to use tagging,
and equation (24) is binding. When tagging is optimal (  < 1), the optimal amount of
monitoring should be such that the social value of the increase in stigma borne by disabled
recipients combined with the social value of the supplementary resources from increasing
total disability transfers to able (the left-hand side of (24)) just oﬀset the valuation at the
marginal cost of public funds. The latter consists of three elements. The ﬁrst element is
the loss of resources due to an increase in the number of able recipients. Actually, from the
cut-oﬀ equation (3), an increase in   does not modify   ∆. Therefore, the share of the able
population is not aﬀected. Yet, for a given   ∆, more able people receive disability beneﬁts.
This increases the cost of a change in monitoring. The second element is the marginal cost
of monitoring: there is a negative eﬀect on the total amount of per capita cost of monitoring
as a result of the change in monitoring ( ). The last element is stigmatization which leads
to more disabled people who prefer to work: ∂￿ δ







decreases public expenditures. The net eﬀect on public expenditures is then ambiguous
when   is modiﬁed. When the marginal cost of monitoring is not huge, monitoring is
always optimal (i.e.   < 1) because it reduces the number of undeserving recipients and
thereby reduces stigmatization.
16Proposition 6 The ranking of consumption levels is identical with and without tagging:
c∆   cδ > cι
As in the model without tagging, ﬁnancial incentives are used for having disabled people
entering the labor force, which pushes cδ strictly below cι at the optimum. From (6), this
also means that the disutility when working for marginal disabled, characterized by   δ, is
larger than the stigma disutility suﬀered by inactive disabled people.
The result cδ > cι contrasts with the traditional optimal ranking, i.e. cι > cδ (e.g.,
Parsons, 1996 and Salanié, 2002). In standard tagging models, tagged disabled people get a
larger consumption than untagged ones. Then, since some of the needy get higher transfers,
equity is improved. At the same time, tagging also improves eﬃciency by circumventing
the incentive constraints that normally limit the extent of redistribution. The second eﬀect
still prevails in my model, but the ﬁrst eﬀect is oﬀset by a new eﬃciency eﬀect. Giving
ﬁnancial incentives to work up to the point that cι becomes strictly larger than cδ directly
improves eﬃciency and indirectly increases equity in my model. In standard models, since
disabled are by assumption always inactive, no eﬃciency eﬀect will push the consumption
of untagged disabled above the one of tagged disabled.
Towards a characterization of conditions when tagging is optimal
From inequality (24), it is obvious that if |∂M/∂ | is very high, the right-hand side of
this inequality can become strictly higher than the left-hand side and therefore, from (23),
  = 1 prevails at the optimum. No monitoring is optimal, and whoever does not work
gets cι. A simple negative income tax system then prevails, and, hence, results of Section
3.1 apply. However, when |∂M/∂ | is not huge, monitoring is always optimal because
it reduces the number of ineligible recipients. Section 5 provides illustrative examples to
check the empirical relevance of the level of monitoring cost beyond which tagging starts
being suboptimal.
Proposition 7 With tagging, properties highlighted with the ∆-excluded criterion are also
valid under a utilitarian criterion
As in the case without tagging (Proposition 5), even if the qualitative results are identical
under both normative criteria, Section 5 shows how the quantitative properties of the
outcomes under both criteria are distinct.
5 An illustration
Combining constraints (3), (6), (11) and the normative criterion (10), it is convenient to
rewrite the problem as:
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This last equation can be rewritten as φ
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= 0. Using a logarithmic utility
function u(.) ≡ ln(.) and equations (3), (6), it is convenient to rewrite φ as
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Substituting (26) into the objective function (25), the problem becomes a three dimen-
sional problem
 
  δ,   ∆, 
 
. (In the same vein, the constrained maximization of utilitarian
criterion (9) can easily become a three dimensional problem.)
The subjacent system of ﬁrst-order conditions is highly nonlinear and too complex
to be studied analytically. The system is still nonlinear when   = 1 (i.e. tagging is
suboptimal), see Appendix 3. Therefore, since multiple local optima may exist, for each
vector of parameters (g,R,wℓ,wh,γ) and for some speciﬁc distribution functions Fδ(δ),
F∆(∆) and monitoring function M( ), I evaluate the objective function (25) for a wide
range of values of the endogenous variables
 
  δ,   ∆, 
 
. Through this numerical method, I
check whether the solution found is the global optimum.
5.1 Calibration
My aim here is merely to provide illustrative examples and I therefore only give results
for speciﬁc δ and ∆ distributions and some speciﬁc values of the distinct parameters. A
fully ﬂedged study and discussion of the controls is beyond the scope of this paper. I
assume δ and ∆ are distributed according to Gamma distributions.8 Let rδ, r∆ be the
parameters characterizing Gamma distributions respectively for δ and ∆. In 1998, almost
20% of people in the US report some level of disability (Stoddard et al., 1998). In 2001,
almost 15% of the population from EU countries (Sweden excluded) of working age report
severe and moderate disability (Eurostat, 2001). Following Benitez-Silva et al. (2004a)
who show that the hypothesis that self-reported disability is an unbiased indicator that
cannot be rejected, I ﬁx γ = 0.15. Here, with two levels of skills, assumptions about wh and
wℓ can hardly be based on actual wage distributions. As a benchmark, the base setting
for parameters is
wℓ = 50, wh = 100, R = 0, g = 3, rδ = 5 and r∆ = 1






The parameter r of a Gamma distribution is equal to the mean and the variance of the distribution.
Gamma distribution takes a large variety of shapes by perturbing only its r parameter. I have checked
that our conclusions are maintained with other continuous distributions deﬁned on the inﬁnite support
[0,+∞).
18A sensitivity analysis on g will be conducted later. I consider R strictly larger than
−[(1 − γ)wh + γwℓ] = −92.5 otherwise the budget constraint (11) is violated.
The per capita cost of monitoring is
M( ) = a(1/  − 1) (27)
with a > 0. This monitoring technology satisﬁes the properties described in Section 2 and
is tractable since it only depends on one parameter, a. Empirical evidence show a large
bureaucracy and costs involved in making disability determinations in the U.S. The average
cost of running Social Security Administration bureaucracy, which determines eligibility
for disability beneﬁts under the Disability Insurance, is about $2000 per application in the
U.S. (Benitez-Silva et al., 2004b). The claims are typically reviewed every year. Hence,
the monthly average cost of monitoring is $166.7.
Up to now, the two monetary values ﬁxed in the model are wℓ = 50 and wh = 100. It
is diﬃcult to calibrate the per capita cost of monitoring relative only to two levels of wage.
In the U.S., the average monthly disability beneﬁt is $786, i.e. 4.7 times the per capita
monitoring cost. In the 1990s, the average labor earnings of disabled people who worked
was slightly higher than the monthly disability beneﬁt but the variance is large (Benitez-
Silva et al., 2004b). I consider M as 0.15 to 0.3 times the labor earnings of disabled
workers (wℓ) to get a range of empirically relevant parameters. Benitez-Silva et al. (2004b)
estimate that approximately 20% of applicants who are ultimately awarded beneﬁts are
not disabled. Substituting   = 20% and M ∈ [7.5;15] into (27), I get a ∈ [1.8;3.8] as
a large interval of plausible values for a. I ﬁx the magnitude of the per capita cost of
monitoring, a, to 2 when it needs to be ﬁxed.
When tagging is suboptimal
My simulations give the threshold values of a, the parameter of the per capita monitoring
cost in (27) beyond which tagging is suboptimal (i.e.   = 1) as expected in Section
4. With the ∆-excluded criterion (10), tagging is suboptimal when a ≥ 73. With the
utilitarian criterion (9), tagging is suboptimal when a ≥ 50.3. Under both criteria, the
threshold value beyond which tagging is suboptimal is large relative to labor earnings
in low-productivity jobs (wℓ = 50) or relative to (per capita) governmental exogenous
resources (R = 0). This threshold also seems unrealisticly high compared to the interval
of empirically plausible values, 1.8 ≤ a ≤ 3.8, I previously proposed.
Another situation where tagging is suboptimal which cannot be grasped by the ﬁrst-
order conditions analysis, but through simulations is the following. Under the utilitarian
criterion (9), when the exogenous resources R become very high (and larger than a and wh
according to all my simulations), tagging becomes suboptimal (  = 1). With my previous
calibrations, tagging becomes suboptimal when R ≥ 130.96 under the utilitarian criterion,
as shown in Figure 1. This numerical result is intuitive. Under the utilitarian criterion,
since the disutility terms ∆ reduces the social welfare level, it is optimal that more and
more able workers stop working when R increases. For R ≥ 130.96, tagging stops being
used and no more able people with ∆ >   ∆ work. The proportion of able workers, π∆,
then sharply shrinks. At R = 130.96, there is a discontinuity in the probability of type II
19errors   which jumps up to 1. The proportion of able workers then has also a discontinuity
at R = 130.96 (see Figure 1).
Under the criterion (10) which does not compensate for distaste for work, my simula-
tions do not report a threshold R beyond which tagging is suboptimal, given the previously
chosen parameters. Intuitively, able people who stop working reduce eﬃciency without
improving equity under ∆-excluded criterion (10). Therefore, under this criterion, the pro-
portion of able people who work, π∆, is stable (see Figure 1) with R. Financial incentives
and tagging both are used to maintained π∆ high and stable.
Comparison of the optima under the ∆-excluded SWF and the utilitarian SWF
The ∆-excluded criterion always allows to reach a higher welfare level than the utilitarian
criterion and a lower stigma level. According to simulations, any ∆-excluded optimum
always gives incentives to or enforce more able people to work (the probability of type II
errors is lower) than the utilitarian optimum.
The results of simulations do not allow to give general rankings of the optimal ci
(i = δ,ι,∆) under the utilitarian SWF compared to the same consumption bundle under
the ∆-excluded criterion. For example, in Figure 2, when a < 72.2, the optimal level of
cδ under the utilitarian criterion is below the optimal level of cδ under the ∆-excluded
criterion. When a ≥ 72.2, this ranking is reversed.
Sensitivity analysis
The ∆-excluded and utilitarian social welfare levels are continuous and decreasing in the
parameter of the per capita cost of monitoring (a) and increasing in the exogenous re-
sources (R). Increasing the cost parameter a in the range where tagging is suboptimal,
i.e. where the monitoring is not used (i.e., a ≥ 50.3 under the utilitarian criterion and
a ≥ 73 under the ∆-excluded criterion) has no more impact on the optimal variables,
see Figure 2. Stigma is not monotonous neither with a nor with R. The probability of
type II error ( ) continuously increases with the cost parameter a (up to   = 1). Under
∆-excluded criterion (10), consumption bundles have discontinuities at a = 73, i.e. when
tagging becomes suboptimal (see Figure 2). Under utilitarian criterion (9), consumption
bundles are continuous with a.
When the exogenous resources increase, we already know that the proportion of able
workers never increases. And the proportion of disabled workers, πδ, decreases under both
criteria. When R > 120, πδ decreases below 0.001 under both criteria.
When the marginal disutility of stigma g increases, the welfare levels under both criteria
continuously decrease. The eﬀect of g on the optimum stigma level σ(.) level is always
positive for small g and may become negative for larger values. Monitoring is used more
intensively, and therefore type II errors decrease with g. With my calibrations, under the
utilitarian criterion, as long as g < 14.7, inequality (8) is satisﬁed hence ∂  δ/∂cι < 0 is
guaranteed. Under the ∆-excluded criterion, g < 15.2 guarantees ∂  δ/∂cι < 0.
Finally, Appendix 4 studies how results are aﬀected when the δ or ∆ disutility distri-
butions are right-bounded.
206 Conclusion
Since the seminal paper of Akerlof (1978), the tagging literature shows that tagged disabled
people should get a larger consumption level than untagged disabled people as long as the
administrative and (net) eﬃciency costs do not oﬀset the advantage of tagging in terms
of equity.
My paper challenges these results. I have introduced participation decisions for both
able and disabled people in this framework. Individual disutilities of work, either due to
disability or distaste for work, are heterogenous among people and private characteristics.
Levels of productivity are also unobservable by the tax authority. According to their
disutility of work due to disability or distaste for work, some able and disabled people
do not participate in the labor force. However, there is a social norm against living oﬀ
other people when one is able and to deserve transfers when one is disabled. Moreover, the
taxpayers and the government do not perfectly screen between disabled and able recipients
of transfers. Therefore, the higher the number (or proportion) of able inactive people, the
higher the social resentment against all the inactive people. Hence disabled people who
receive transfers have a loss of utility due to stigma. Stigma increases with the number
(or proportion) of non-disabled recipients.
Tagging transfers according to disability characteristics enables us to reduce this num-
ber of frauders, and therefore improves equity by reducing stigma. Considering endogenous
stigma then plays in favor of tagging. Tagging is optimal as long as its monitoring costs
do not oﬀset the gains in terms of incentives and of reduction of stigma. In this con-
text, tagged disabled people should get a lower consumption level than untagged disabled
people, which is in contrast to standard results.
There are two main questions pertaining to the optimal consumption proﬁle and stigma
which I have not addressed and yet seem worthy of attention. The ﬁrst focuses on outcomes
under alternative SWF. Rather than using a utilitarian criterion or the criterion which
does not compensate for distaste for work, a future analysis could study a SWF which is a
weighted sum of individual utilities where the weights are distinct from the proportions of
population. This should not aﬀect the main results. However, some assumptions on the
weights may be necessary to be able to rank consumption bundles. The optimum under
a maxi-min criterion (i.e. a criterion which maximizes the well-being of the least-well oﬀ
who are the tagged disabled in the model) could also be presented. However, the ﬁrst-
order conditions’ analysis under maxi-min does not allow us to unambiguously rank the
consumption bundles for tagged and untagged disabled agents. Simulations would then
be required.
The second question concerns the utility form of disabled applicants who respond to
less favorable treatment by other members of society. When a disabled individual works,
he shows that he is not a cheater. Beside stigma suﬀered by disabled recipients, some
reward could then be introduced in the disabled worker’s utility function. Moreover,
if stigma hurts more cheaters than disabled people, stigma could also serve the useful
role of reducing the number of undeserving claimants. Deﬁning stigma as such a policy
21instrument can suggest an interesting way to pursue this line of analysis one step further.
Finally, my modelling of stigma contrasts with the argument that means-testing and
tagging imply more stigma than a more universal and unconditional transfer system, e.g.
a basic income which does not depend upon performing any labor services or satisfying
other conditions (Van Parijs, 2000). This argument, however, requires a distinct deﬁni-
tion for stigma: the psychological costs due to the demeaning and intrusive procedures
about beneﬁts reserved for the needy, the destitute, those identiﬁed as unable to fend
for themselves (Van Parijs, 2000). Jacquet and Van der linden (2006) show that tagging
is suboptimal, under fairly mild conditions, when this alternative deﬁnition of stigma is
considered.
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23Appendix 1: Proofs of Lemmata and Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
I proceed by contradiction. Suppose c∆ < cδ. All able individuals who work choose
to produce wℓ units and receive net income cδ. From (3) and (4), nobody get c∆ as
consumption bundle. Then, keeping cδ ﬁxed, we can assume dc∆ > 0 such that c∆+dc∆ =
cδ. Now able people who work produce wh units and get c∆ as consumption bundle.
Increasing the level of c∆ up to cδ does not require any additional consumption since
c∆ + dc∆ − cδ = 0 and since   ∆ and the number of able people who work is unchanged.
The number of able people who apply for and take up beneﬁts is then also unchanged.
Hence from (2),   δ and the number of disabled taking up assistance do not change as well.
Yet, all able workers now choose skilled jobs and earn wh(> wℓ). Since the cost in terms
of supplementary consumption is zero and the diﬀerence wh − wℓ is strictly positive, a
net receipt appears: wh − wℓ > 0. The ﬁscal pie increases and more redistribution can
occur. This will indubitably increase welfare. Therefore, it cannot be optimal for the
government to let cδ > c∆, and, thus, consumption when producing more units must be
larger: c∆   cδ.
Proof of Proposition 3
As ∀δ : fδ(δ) > 0, all disabled people work means   δ → ∞ at the optimum. Since
consumption levels are ﬁnite, from (6),   δ cannot tend to ∞. The same argument applies
for showing that some able people mimic disabled inactive workers at the optimum.
If no-one works, it is optimal for everyone to have the same consumption : cι = c∆ =
cδ = R. This allocation will not be optimal if those with the least handicap, δ (resp.
the least disutility of work, ∆) were to choose to work for the additional consumption
equal to their marginal product. It will be the case because: u(R + wℓ) > u(R) (resp.
u(R + wh) > u(R)). This implies that   δ > 0 (resp.   ∆ > 0) at the optimum.
From (3) and   ∆ > 0, we know:
c∆ > cι
Some of the able (those characterized by an ∆ lower than   ∆) will decide to work (with
productivity wh) to obtain a higher consumption level.
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is straightforward by dividing (16), (17) and (18) by u′(c∆), u′(cδ) and u′(cι)
respectively, and adding these equations.
Proof of Proposition 4
From Lemma 1 and Propositions 3 that induces 0 < πj < 1 (j = a,ℓ,d), we know that



















⇔ c∆ > cι   cδ (29)
In both cases, (28) and (29), u′(c∆) < λ. Moreover, if (28) prevails, we have: u′(cι) > λ
and if (29) is correct then: u′(cι) > λ. But the latter cannot prevail at the optimum. If the
ﬁrst-order condition with respect to cδ (17) is considered, because of u′(cδ) > λ, the left-
hand side would be positive and it would require that wℓ−cδ +cι < 0 ⇔ cδ −cι > wℓ > 0.
That contradicts cι   cδ.
I show now that the sign of wℓ−cδ is ambiguous. The budget constraint (11) where   = 1
can be rewritten as:












(cι − cδ) + π∆(wℓ − wh) + π∆(c∆ − cδ) − R (30)







Proposition 4) and the other terms are positive (c∆ − cδ ≥ 0 from Lemma 1) except −R
which can take both signs. Hence, the sign of wℓ − cδ is ambiguous. The gross income of
untagged disabled can be increased (in case of a transfer: wℓ − cδ < 0) or decreased (in
case of a tax: wℓ − cδ > 0) by the optimal tax-transfer system.
Proof of Proposition 5
When using a utilitarian criterion, the unique modiﬁcations in the ﬁrst-order conditions
(16)-(18) in comparison with the ones obtained with the ∆-excluded SWF (10) concerns
the ones with respect to c∆ and cδ. The terms −(1 − γ)f∆(  ∆)  ∆ and +(1 − γ)f∆(  ∆)  ∆





































































)(wℓ − cδ + cι)
  
u′(cι)
Therefore, dividing these equations by u′(c∆), u′(cδ) and u′(cι) respectively, and adding
them, Lemma 1 is still valid. Therefore, Propositions 4 is still valid under the ∆-excluded
criterion since its proof is straightforward from Lemma 1.
25Proof of Proposition 6
First, Proposition 1 is valid whatever the objective function. Second, Equation (19) is
again derived by dividing (21), (22) and (23) by u′(c∆), u′(cδ) and u′(cι) respectively, and
adding these equations. Therefore, since   δ,   ∆ > 0, Proposition 6 can be shown exactly as
Proposition 4. The proof is then not reproduced here.
Proof of Proposition 7
With a utilitarian objective function, the unique modiﬁcation in the ﬁrst-order conditions
in comparison with the ones obtained with the criterion where ∆ is simply excluded




  ∆ into (20)
disappears. Similarly, the term (1−γ)f∆(  ∆)   ∆ into (22) is cancelled. Therefore, dividing
these ﬁrst-order conditions by u′(c∆), u′(cδ) and u′(cι) respectively, and adding them,
Lemma 1 is still valid. With the utilitarian criterion, the proof of Proposition 5 can then
be replicated here.
Appendix 2. When stigma depends on the proportion of
cheaters rather than on its absolute number
In the model without tagging (that is   = 1), consider stigma as a function of the propor-
tion of undeserving recipients rather than their number:
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From (3) and (6) where equation (31) is substituted into the latter and using the implicit
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> 0
If one wants to guarantee that ∂  δ/∂cι < 0, from (32), one needs: (1 + ∂S/∂  ∆)(1 −
∂S/∂  δ)−1 > 0, i.e.: either
g < C
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−1.
The ﬁrst-order conditions from the constrained maximization of ∆-excluded criterion
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  1 + ∂S/∂  ∆
1 − ∂S/∂  δ
(wℓ − cδ + cι)
  
u′(cι)
Divide these three equations respectively by u′(c∆), u′(cδ) and u′(cι) and sum them, I
ﬁnd back equation (19). Therefore, Lemma (1) and Proposition (4) are maintained when
stigma is deﬁned as a function of the proportion of cheaters.
I have also checked that these lemma and propositions are still valid with a utilitarian
criterion. Finally, a similar exercise can be maintained when tagging is introduced: the
previous results of Section 4 are still valid.
Appendix 3. Non-linear ﬁrst-order conditions from the max-
imization of (25)
Let us present the ﬁrst-order conditions from the maximization of (25) where (26) is
substituted and where   = 1, that is without tagging. The problem then becomes a
maximization with respect to
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denotes (25) after substitution of
27(26). The optimum
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+ R > 0
The above system deﬁnes an implicit relationship between the optimal values of   δ,   ∆ and





ι , and R). This relationship
is highly nonlinear.
Appendix 4. Right-bounded distributions of disutility
Even if it seems empirically plausible to assume that some disabled people are completely
unable to work, δ → ∞ and that some of the able are very prone to be voluntarily inactive,
∆ → ∞, it is interesting to check how my results are aﬀected when the distributions of δ
and ∆ are right-bounded.
Assume now δ < +∞. Intuitively, when the disabilities are not too high, it may be
optimal to give ﬁnancial incentives such that all the disabled people work. More precisely,
the optimum may be characterized by   δ = δ. In this case, a simple negative income tax
system allows one to perfectly screen between disabled and able people. One knows that
all non-workers are lazy able individuals and that one can costlessly instruct them to work.
The constraint (3) does then not have to be satisﬁed. Such an optimum is characterized
by the ﬁrst-best ranking of consumption: c∆ = cδ. Unreported simulations show that
with a right-truncated disabilities distribution, starting from a situation where   δ < δ is
optimal,   δ = δ becomes optimal if:
(i) the upper bound of the distribution of pains due to disability (δ) decreases
(ii) the parameter of the per capita cost of monitoring (a) increases
(iii) the exogenous resources (R) decrease
28(iv) the marginal disutility of stigma (g) increases.
Unreported simulations show that with a right-truncated distribution of distastes for
work, starting from a situation where   ∆ < ∆ is optimal,   ∆ = ∆ becomes optimal under
the same assumptions (i) to (iv). It is then optimal not to use tagging and only ﬁnancial
incentives through the negative income tax system to get an optimum where all able people











Figure 1: Under the utilitarian SWF, the probability of type II error,  , increases and
the proportion of able workers, π∆, decreases, with exogenous resources, R. Under the ∆-
excluded criterion,   decreases with R and π∆ is maintained stable. Under the utilitarian















Figure 2: Consumption levels under the utilitarian and ∆-excluded criteria as functions
of a, the magnitude of the per capita cost of monitoring. Tagging is suboptimal and
consumption bundles constant when a ≥ 73 under the ∆-excluded criterion, and when
a ≥ 50.3 under the utilitarian criterion.
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